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Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to  provide user with theoretical foundations of the MCBARG 
system and with information necessary to use the system. Section 1 contains extended sum- 
mary including general information about the bargaining problem and proposed solution 
approach. Section 2 contains mathematical formulation of the multicriteria bargaining p rob  
lem and methodological background of solution concept and interactive algorithm. Section 3 
explains using of the system, i.e. how to create model of bargaining game and support medi- 
ation. Section 4 presents an illustrative example of bargaining game played with the system 
support. Section 5 contains technical information. 
1 Extended summary 
Many aspects of economic, environmental, or technological activity are influenced directly 
by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations (uplayersn). In the pure 
bargaining problem, considered in the MCBARG system, the bargaining conditions are de- 
termined entirely by the bounds of discussion, within which the final outcome is determined 
by the interaction of the players. Even in the case of one individual, firm or nation, there are 
many complex situations in which the decision maker needs help to learn about possible de- 
cision options and decision consequences. The MCBARG system enables learning process of 
the players, and supports reaching the final outcome in the multicriteria bargaining problem. 
It is based on the theoretical results presented in (Bronisz, Krus, Wierzbicki, 1988). 
The multicriteria bargaining problem is a generalization of classical bargaining problem, 
under assumption that there are not given explicitly the utility functions of participants. This 
generalization follows from the fact that an aggregation of participants or player's objectives 
is often impossible because of various practical limitations of the utility theory. The problem 
is defined by an agreement set - the set of outcomes that can be reached under unanimous 
agreement of the players, and by a disagreement (status quo) point which is a result of the 
problem if there is no such an agreement. 
The proposed interactive process consists in generation of sequence of the outcomes lead- 
ing to  the nondominatated solution. The process is based on limited confidence principle, 
taken from practical observation, which says that the players have limited confidence in their 
ability to predict consequences and possible outcomes, hence each player tries to prevent 
other players from receiving disproportionally large gains. The generated outcomes are con- 
sistent with preferences of the players. The process assure some fairness rules and is resistant 
to the various manipulations of the players. 
The algorithm consists of a number of rounds. Each round starts a t  the current status 
quo point (the first round starts from the initial status quo point). At each round the player 
specifies his confidence coefficient (i.e. defines part of the maximal improvement of the out- 
comes the counter players can obtain in the round). Furthermore assuming some moves of 
the other players, he tests different improvement directions for his objectives. This phase of 
the work with MCBARG system consists in an interactive scanning of outcomes performed 
by each player who specifies reference points in the objective space. The reference points are 
composed of aspiration levels of each player for his objectives. The players get additional 
information about the range of possible outcomes for a given confidence coefficient and some 
assumed actions of the counter players. This information is useful for reasonable specification 
of the aspiration levels. The system generates also some initial values for the aspiration levels 
and calculates corresponding outcomes (called neutral outcomes). The scanning of the player 
outcomes is performed in the system through directional optimization and lexicographic im- 
provement of the week Pareto outcomes. The system responds to  the player with attainable, 
efficient (under the assumed confidence coefficient) outcomes that strictly correspond to  the 
player-specified aspirations. The results obtained for a number of different reference points 
can be easily compared in both numerical and graphical form. To finish this phase the player 
is required to select, according to his preferences, his reference point indicating his preferable 
improvement direction. These points selected independently by all the players are basis for 
calculation of the result of the round. The result is calculated following the limited confi- 
dence principle (the minimal confidence coefficient is used for all players) trying to  improve 
outcomes for all the players in the directions specified by their reference points. Thus, the 
system acts as a neutral mediator proposing a eingle-test provisional agreement improving 
the initial situation and forming a basic for next round of negotiationa.The results are pre- 
sented to the players in form of report, and the players can go to  the next round aseuming 
the obtained result as a new status quo point. The process terminates when the efficient, 
strict Pareto optimal solution in the agreement set is reached. 
The system includes a generator and an editor of the model of the bargaining problem 
for which the interactive process is performed. The model describes the agreement set in 
form of a set of inequalities, and the status quo point. The generator and the editor enable 
introducing linear or nonlinear formulas defining the inequalities using standard operators 
and functions. An illustrative example has been prepared, which relates to  the problem of 
cooperation of two farms. The problem consists in division of the products resulting from 
cooperation between the farm owners according to  their preferences. 
2 Theoretical foundations 
2.1 Introduction 
In most approaches (see Nash, 1950, Raiffa, 1953, Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975, Roth, 1979)) 
the bargaining problem has been considered in the case of unicriterial payoffs of players, i.e. 
when the preferences of particular players are expressed by utility functions. In many practical 
applications however, players trying to balance a number of objectives might have difficulties 
while constructing such utility functions. Moreover, the classic literature considers mostly 
axiomatic models of bargaining which yield one-shot solutions and do not result in procedures 
describing a process of reaching a binding agreement. 
We consider n players, each with several objectives, so we deal with a multiobjective 
bargaining problem. In this problem, the players are faced with an agreement set of feasible 
outcomes. Any such outcome can be accepted as the result if i t  is specified by an unanimous 
agreement of all players. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, the status quo 
point is the result. If there are feasible outcomes which all participants prefer to  the status 
quo point, then there is an incentive to  reach an agreement. Ln most situations, players differ 
in their opinions which outcome is most preferable, hence there is a need for bargaining and 
negotiation. 
Dealing with multiple payoffs, we do not assume that there exist explicitly given utility 
functions of the players. In this case the solution can be found in an interactive procedure. 
Such a procedure is considered here. The procedure starts from the status quo point and leads 
to  a nondominated, individually rational solution belonging to  the agreement set. During the 
interaction, players can express their preferences and can influence the course of the iterative 
process. 
2.2 Problem formulation and definitions 
Let N = {1,2,. . . , n) be the finite set of players, each player having objectives. A 
multiobjective bargaining problem is defined as a pair (S, d), where an agreement set S is 
a subset of - dimensional Euclidean space, called RNM, and a disagreement point 
(status quo point) d belonging to  S. 
The bargaining problem has the following interpretation: every point z E RNM, 
2 = (21, 22,. . -, zn), Z; = (zil, zi2,. . . , zi,,,,.), in the agreement set S represents payoffs for 
all the players that can be reached when they do cooperate with each other (zij denotes 
the payoff of the j-th objective for the i-th ~ l a ~ e r ) .  If the players do not cooperate, the 
disagreement point is the result. 
We assume that each player tries t o  maximize his every objective. 
We employ a convention that for z ,  y E Rk, z _> y implies zi 2 yi for i = 1, .  . . , k, z > y 
implies z _> y, z # y, z >> y implies zi > y, for i = 1, .  . . , k. We say that z E Rk is a weak 
Pareto optimal point in X if z E X and there is no y E X such that y >> z;  z E X is a strict 
Pareto optimal point in X if there is no y E X such that y > z. 
We confine our consideration to  the class of all multicriteria bargaining games (S, d) 
satisfying the following conditions: 
(i) S is compact and there is z E S such that z > d, 
(ii) S is comprehensive, i.e. for z E S if d 5 y 5 z then y E S .  
(iii) For any z E S ,  let Q(S, z )  = { i : y > z ,  yi > z; for some y E S ). Then for any z E S ,  
there exists y E S such that y 2 z,  y; > z; for each i E Q(S, 2). 
Condition (i) states that the set S is closed, upper bounded and the problem is not 
degenerated. Condition (ii) says that objectives are disposable, i.e. that if the players can 
reach the outcome z then they can reach any outcome worse than z .  Q(S, z )  is the set of all 
coordinates in RNM, payoffs of whose members can be increased from z in S .  Condition (iii) 
states that the set of Pareto optimal points in S contains no 'holes". We do not assume 
convexity of S ,  however, any convex set satisfies Condition (iii). 
The problem consists in supporting the players in reaching a nondominated solution, 
agreeable and close to their preferences. 
Definitions: 
A point z' E S is defined as i-nondominated, 1 E N ,  if there is no y E S such that y; > zi. 
A point u E RNM is defined as a utopia point relative to aspirations (RA utopia point) if for 
each player i E N,  there is an i-nondominated point zi E S such that u; = zi. 
The i-nondominated point is an outcome which could be achieved by a rational player i 
if he would have full control of the moves of the other players. Let us observe that if in the 
unicriterial set there is only one i-nondominated point, in the multicriteria case considered 
here there is a set of such points. Each player i ,  i E N,  is required then to  investigate the 
set of i-nondominated points in S as mi-dimensional multicriteria decision problem and then 
to select one i-nondominated point as his most preferable outcome. 
The RA utopia point generated by the selected i-nondominated points, i E N ,  carries 
information about the most preferable outcomes for all the players. The RA utopia point sig- 
nificantly differs from the ideal (utopia) point defined by the maximal values of all objectives 
in set S. 
2.3 Interactive procedure 
We are interested in a constructive procedure that is acceptable by all players, starts a t  the 
status quo point and leads to  a strict Pareto optimal point in S .  The procedure can be 
described as a sequence, {8)~,o,  of agreement points 8 such that d' = d, 8 E S ,  8 > 8-', 
for t = 1,2 , .  . . , dk is a strict Pareto optimal point in S. (The assumption 8 2 8-' follows 
from the fact that no player will accept improvement of payoffs for other players a t  the cost 
of his concession.) At every round t, each player i E N specifies his preferable reference point 
r;' E Rmi, r: > 4 defining his improvement direction Xf E Rmi, Xf = r;' - 4, and proposes 
his confidence coefficient af E R, 0 < af 5 1. The improvement direction Xf indicates the 
i-th players preferences over his objectives a t  round t. The confidence coefficient af reflects 
his ability a t  round t to describe preferences and to  predict precisely all consequences and 
possible outcomes in S .  (For more detailed justification, see Fandel, Wierzbicki, 1985, and 
Bronisz, Krus, Wierzbicki, 1988). 
We propose an interactive negotiation process defined by a procedure: 
{&)& such that d' = d, (*I 
8 = 8 - I  + E' * [u(S, 8 - ' ,  At)  - 8-'1 for t = 1,2, .  . . , 
where A t  E R ~ ~ ,  A t  = (Atl, A:, . . . , A',), is the improvement direction specified jointly by 
all the players, u(S, 8 - ' ,  At) E R~~ is the utopia point relative to  the direction A t  at 
round t defined by u(S, &-I, A t )  = (ul(S, &-I, A:), uZ(S, 8 - ' ,  Xi), . . . , u,(S, 8- ' ,  A',)), 
ui(S, 8 - l ,  A:) = max, - { z, E Rmi : 2 E S, z > 8 - l ,  z, = 4-I + aA: for some 
a E R }, Moreover, = min (a:, a;, . . .,a:, ah,) E R, where ah, is the maximal 
number a such that 8 - I  + a [u(s, 8 -1 ,  At) - 8-11 belongs to S .  
The utopia point u(S, &-I, At) relative to the aspirations of the players (and relative to 
direction A t )  reflects the preferences of the particular players when the improvement direc- 
tion At is specified at  round t. The individual outcome ui(S, 8- ' ,  A f )  is the maximal payoff 
in S for the i-th player from 8-' according to the improvement direction Af, while E' is 
the minimal confidence coefficient of the players a t  round t (we assume that no player can 
agree on a coefficient greater than his) such that a new calculated agreement point belongs 
to  S. The preferable direction Xf at round t is specified on the basis of interactive scanning 
of a number of solutions generated for assumed by players different reference points. The 
proposed approach is very closed to the achievement function concept (Wierzbicki, 1982) 
from the point of view of the user. Analogously, a special way of the parametric scalariza- 
tion of the multiobjective problem is utilized to  influence on the selection of solutions by 
changing reference points. To solve the problem, directional maximization is applied, using 
a bisection method. (see Bronisz and Krus, 1988). The scanning (called in the system the 
improvement directions testing) is performed independently by each of players. Given the 
information about the current status quo and ideal point the player proposes a number of 
reference points and confidence coefficient. For each reference point r: > 4 at  the round t 
and confidence coefficient af given by the player, the system calculates: 
ui(S, dl-', A:) = max, { r, E Rmi : 2 E S ,  z 2 dl-', r, = 4-I + aXf for some a E R }, 
- 
one shot solution: 
tentative solution: 
yt = 6-' + at * [u(s, d- ' ,  At)  - dl-'] 
maximal confidence coefficient: 
t 
amax = mm2 { a €  R : b - ' + a * [ u ( ~ , d - ' , A ~ )  -&-'I E S  for some a~ R ) ,  
where At E RNM, At = (Ai,A:, . . .,A;), AS = A:-' for j # i ,  A: = r: - 4, 
u(S, d-', At) E RNM is the utopia point relative to the direction A'. 
Having the above information for a number of reference points, the players select his 
preferable one. It defines the improvement direction of this player. Defined in this way 
improvement directions of all the players Af are used for calculation of the result d of the 
negotiation round. 
The procedure is based on the following theoretical result (see: Bronisz, Krus, Lopuch, 
1987, and Bronisz, Krus, Wierzbicki, 1988): 
Theorem 1. For any multicriteria bargaining game (S, d) satisfying conditions (i), (ii) 
and (iii) and for any confidence coefficients af such that 0 < E 5 a: 5 1, t = 1,2 , .  . . , T there 
is a unique process d,  t = 0, 1, . . . , T, T 5 m ,  described by (*) satisfying the following 
postulates: 
P3. dr ( = limt,, d if T = m ) is a strict Pareto optimal point in S. 
P4. Principle of a-limited confidence. Let 0 < a: 5 1 be a given confidence coefficient of 
the i-th player a t  round t. Then acceptable demands are limited by: 
for t = 1, . . . , T ,  where akin is a joint confidence coefficient a t  round t ,  
akin =min{a i ,  . . . ,a ; ) ,  u ( & - ' ) i s t h e R ~ u t o p i a p o i n t o f t h e s e t { z ~ S : z ~  d-') 
reflecting the preferences of the players. 
P5. Principle of recursive rationality. Given d ,  a t  each round t, there is no such outcome 
z E S, z > 8, that z satisfies P4. 
P6. Principle of proportional gains. For each round t, t = 1, . . . , T,  there is a number 
/3 > 0 such that 
d - d-' = /3[u(d-') - 6-'I. 
The presented approach has been examined in a case of one-round process with confidence 
coefficients of the players equal one. Corresponding one shot solution has been characterized 
axiomatically (Bronisz and Krus, 1987a). It is easy to  notice that in the unicriterial case, 
each game (S, d) has a unique utopia point which coincides with the ideal point and the one 
shot solution coincides with the Raiffa solution (see Raiffa, 1953, Roth, 1979). 
The testing of improvement directions by particular players is really important element of 
the procedure. It is assumed that after the testing each player selects his preferable direction. 
However, it may happend that a player has not sufficiently tested his set of nondominated 
points and selects a weak Pareto outcome as his preferable result. In such a case, even if all 
the players assume the confidence coefficients greater than the values of maximal confidence 
coefficients, the procedure should proceed in several iterations more, till it will reach strict 
Pareto solution in S .  In the system this inconvenience is removed by application of an 
option of lexicographical improvement of weak Pareto solution to strict Pareto one without 
interaction of the players. The option is used only in the case that d l  the players assume their 
confidence coefficients greater then the values of maximd confidence coefficients. In such a 
case it is assumed that they are going to finish the interactive process. The lexicographical 
improvement proceeds in the following way: 
Let us assume that in round t the obtained agreement point 
dt = dt-' + E * [u(S,dt-l, At) - &-'I is weak Pareto optimal. For a finite subsets of inte- 
ger numbers I ,  J ,  let e(I ,  J )  = (el(I ,  J), .. . , en(I, J ) )  E R * ~  be such that eij(I, J )  = At for 
i E I and j E J ,  otherwise eij(I, J) = 0. 
Given y E S with Q(S, y) # 0, define z(S, y) E S by 
z ( S , y ) = m a x , { z ~ ~ : z = ~ + a * e ( ~ ( ~ , ~ ) )  - forsome U E R } .  
Intuitively, the vector e(Q(S,y)) includes all the coordinates of vector At, along with the 
solution can be improved. Otherwise, corresponding coordinate of the vector e(Q(S, y)) is 
equal to 0. Then the lexicographical improvement can be defined by the sequence { z j ) g o  
such that z0 = 4, and z j  = z(S, =I-') for j = 1,2, .  . . . It is shown (Bronisz and Krus, 1988) 
that there is exactly one such sequence, moreover this sequence is finite. 
The presented lexicographical improvement has been examined in a case of one-round 
process, i.e. when weak Pareto optimal solution is reached in the first round. It is shown 
(Bronisz and Krus, 1988) that in such a case the solution of the bargaining process can be 
described with the Rawlsian lexmin principle (Rawls, 1971). Moreover in the unicriterial 
case, the solution coincides with the Imai solution (Irnai, 1983). 
Remark. In the presented approach we assume that each player tries to maximize his every 
objective. In a case that some of objectives should be minimized, we can use a following linear 
transformation of objectives T such that 
where q, E R, y;, = 1 if the j-th objective of the a-th player is maximized, 7,, = -1 if the 
j-th objective of the i-th player is minimized. The selection of q, is arbitrary, it can not 
influence on the solution if we use the same transformation on the reference points (see the 
third objectives in presented example, section 4). 
3 User guide 
The MCBARG system is a decision support system designed to  help in analysis of decision 
situation and mediation in multicriteria bargaining problem in which a mathematical model 
of the problem can be formulated by a status-quo point and a system of inequalities describing 
agreement set in objective space of the players. 
The program is recorded on one diskette that should be installed on an IBM-PC-XT, 
AT or compatible computer with Hercules Graphics Card, Color Graphic Adapter (CGA) 
or Enhanced Graphics Adapter (EGA). A diskette contains compiled code of the program 
together with some data files for a demonstrative example of the bargaining problem. 
The system supports the following general functions: 
1. The definition and edition of a model of bargaining problem. 
2. Interactive mediation. 
3. Report of successive agreement outcomes. 
The interactive mediation proceeds in a number of rounds and in each round the system 
supports: 
Initial multiobjective analysis of the bargaining problem for each player, resulting in 
estimation of bounds on efficient outcomes and learning about the extreme and neutral 
outcomes. 
Unilateral, interactive analysis of the problem with the stress on learning, organized 
through system response to  user specified confidence coefficients and aspiration levels for 
objective outcomes. The systems responds with efficient (under the assumed confidence 
coefficient) objective outcomes. 
Calculation of the multilateral, cooperative solution of the round. Reporting the results 
of the already performed rounds. 
The system is self-explaining, it includes a set of information facilitating working with 
the system. User is provided with a set of menu which allows him to select a needed option 
easily. 
In the following sections more detailed information about particular options of the system 
menus are presented. 
INFO option 
The INFO option presents general information about the system. 
SET UP MODEL option 
The SET UP MODEL option enables definition and edition of a model of bargaining problem. 
The bargaining problem is described by a set of players having several criteria, by an agree- 
ment set and by a status quo point. 
The following options of SET UP MODEL menu allow: 
LOAD - loading an existing model or starting creation of a new one. 
EDIT - editing an existing model or creating a new one. 
SAVE - saving a currently edited model. 
COMPILE - compiling the loaded model and performing initial calculation. 
The LOAD option enables selection of one of displayed file names or input of a new file 
name (default extension of file names is .MOD). 
The EDIT option enables edition or creation of a model. The built-in editor is specially 
designed for this purpose. To create a new model the following values must be introduced: 
number of players (PLAYERS option). 
Default: 2 players. Maximum: 5 players. 
number of criteria of each player (CRITERIA option). 
Default: 2 criteria. Maximum: 9 criteria. 
names of criteria (CRITERIA option) 
status quo value for each criteria (CRITERIA option). 
Default: 0.0. 
set of formulae describing the agreement set (FOFMJLAE option). 
The players are recognized by the successive numbers. To facilitate description of criteria 
names in formulae, the criterion of the given player has the following alphanumeric code: 
"ln", where 1 means letter of the given player (a or A - first player, b or B - second player, 
and so on), n denotes number of the criterion. (For example, "c2" means variable for the 
second criterion of the third player). 
The set of formulae describing an agreement set should be in the form: 
what gives the following set of inequalities: 
expression-I >= 0 for I = 1,2,.  . . , N. 
A formulaname-I, I = 1 , .  . . , N,  should begin with a letter. It can be treated as 
a comment to an e x p r e s s i o n l .  An exp re s s ion l ,  I = 1, .  . . , N,  is Pascal-language-like 
expression, which can include: 
constants - in normal or in exponential form; 
variables for criteria - in presented above alphanumeric code "In"; 
operators divided into 4 categories, listed by their order of precedence: 
1 Unary minus: - , 
2 Exponentiation: ' , 
3 Multiplying operators: *, / , 
4 1 Adding operators: +, - ; 
parenthesizes: (, 1 ; 
arithmetic functions: s i n ,  cos, exp, log. The argument of each function should be 
closed in parenthesizes. 
sin - returns the sine of the argument (the argument is expressed in radians), 
cos - returns the cosine of the argument (the argument is expresses in radians), 
exp - returns the exponential of the argument, 
log - returns the natural logarithm of the argument. 
EXAMPLE of formula for two players, each one having two criteria: 
formula = 1000 - a1 - exp(a2+bl) - ( b2 - 1.05e-2 ) ^ 2  ; 
An edited model is stored in memory, if you want to use the same model in future you 
should write it on the disk with SAVE option. 
To utilize the model in the next rounds (TEST DIRECTION option, CALCULATE NEW AGREE 
MENT option) you should perform COMPILE option. This option produces as an output a 
binary code as well as performs some initial calculations including, among others, checking 
correctness of the model of bargaining problem. 
TEST DIRECTION option 
The TEST DIRECTION option enables testing different improvements direction starting from 
current status quo. It allows interactive scanning of outcomes variants. The variants are 
generated for the player specified reference points. The points correspond to the improvement 
directions. The resulting outcomes are calculated for player assumed confidence coefficient 
and assumed improvement directions of other players. By the scanning the player can test 
his preferences and select his preferable outcome and corresponding reference point. 
The following options allow : 
CONF-COEF - specification of confidence coefficient, it should be in the range (0, 11, 
NEWREF - specification of reference point and creation of a new variant, it should be 
greater or equal to the current status quo point, 
SELECT - selection of the preferable variant, 
GRAPH - presentation of solution in graphical form, 
SCROLL-CRIT - scrolling criteria, 
SCROLL-VAR - scrolling variants, 
EXIT - exit to  the main menu. 
Using this options the player can create and compare a number of outcomes variants, 
specifying confidence coefficient and different reference points. The system presents current 
status quo and ideal point. They define range of possible outcomes and reasonable refer- 
ence points. Created variants are stored on the disk. The first variant is created by the 
system, under assumption of the reference point equal to ideal point, which serves the player 
introductory information. For each variant the system calculates and presents: 
- solution outcomes (Solution), 
- maximal confidence coefficient (Max conf coeff.), 
- one shot solution (One shot solution), 
- utopia point relative to  aspiration of the player (RA-utopia point). 
One shot solution denotes outcomes the player could obtained under assumption of the full 
confidence (i.e. confidence coefficient equal to one). The RA-utopia point denotes outcomes 
the player could obtained under assumption that other players have outcomes on the level 
of status quo. The scrolling and graph options facilitate comparison of any variants on the 
screen. 
Testing improvement direction phase should be performed by all the players, and finished 
with the selection of the preferable variant by each of them. 
CALCULATE NEW AGREEMENT and REPORT options 
The CALCULATE NEW AGREEMENT option enables calculation of a new agreement outcome ac- 
cording to  the preferable reference points and minimal confidence coefficient assumed by the 
players in the TEST DIRECTION phase. The result can be presented independently t o  the play- 
ers using the W O R T  option. The calculated agreement solution is assumed as the current 
status quo in the next iteration. If the current agreement outcome is strictly Pareto optimal 
in the agreement set, the bargaining process is finished. 
4 Example session 
After starting from the distributed disk using command line: MCBARG, our system will be 
loaded and you will see on the first screen full name of the program, names of the authors 
and institutions, version number and date of release (Figure 1). 
If you want to work with the system just press any key. The program will display the 
first menu (Figure 2). 
It will be called as the M A I N  menu and will appear in the left upper corner of the screen. 
On the bottom of the screen you can see bright blue bar (help bar) with brief explanation of 
all active keys at  the moment. The help bars will appear during all phases of the work with 
the system. 
Notice that one of the commands (options) of menu is highlighted. This is the command 
where the cursor is resting. You can activate this command pressing the Enter key or you 
can move to another command using the arrow keys. There is, however, one thing you should 
remember of: you can not use the commands in any order. First you have to  establish the 
active model (the SET UP MODEL option) and then you can start playing with it (the TEST 
DIRECTION, CALCULATE NEW AGREEMENT, and REPORT options). If it is not obvious what to 
do next, just press F10 key (HELP) or select the INFO option for more information. 
MCRARG 
SYSTEM SUPPORTING M U L T I C R I T E R I G  R A R G Q I N I N G  
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Figure 1 
- M A I N  MENU 
INFORMAT I O N  
S E T  U F  MODEL 
TEST D I R E C T  I O N  
CALCULATE NEW AGREEMENT 
REPORT 
EX I T  
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Figure 2 
Let us continue our session. If the cursor remains on the SET UP MODEL option, just press 
the Enter key. In other case first move the cursor to  it. The system will transfer control to  
the SET UP MODEL menu displayed below: 
SET UP MDDEL 
SET UP MODEL MENU 
COMF I LE 
f 4 Home End - move bar d - select ootion F10 - help 
Figure 3 
Once again, you are asked to select an option from the above menu. At first, you have 
to  select the LOAD option which allows you to establish the active model by creating a new 
one or selecting an existing one. Other options are inactive until an active model name is 
available. So move the cursor to  the LOAD option (if it does not remain in it) and press Enter 
key. Your screen will look like in the figure 4. 
In the bottom window you will see file names of the models created during the previous 
sessions. Each of displayed file names has an extension .MOD, it is the default extension. Lets 
choose the AGRICO.MOD. Just press the Enter key. This will be our illustrative example to 
show you what it is the MCBARG system and how you can work with it. The AGRICO model 
shows us an bargaining problem related to  cooperation of two farms. The farm owners try 
to  maximize production of the agricultural products and minimize inputs for the production 
under constraints related to  the conditions of the production and applied technologies. The 
following two situations can be considered. In the first one, each owner acts independently, 
that is, he does not plan his production with the other. In this case, having substantial model 
of the farm production, to formulate production plan according to  his preferences, he can 
use, as a supporting tool, one of the multiobjective optimization packages from the DIDAS 
family (Rogowski, Sobczyk, Wierzbicki, 1987). In the second situation, the owners decide 
to  cooperate. Typically, in such a case, some surplus is obtained in comparison to  the first 
case. It is a result of scale effects and better utilization of production inputs. Assuming 
cooperation, the farm owners have the problem how to allocate the surplus between them. 
They would like to take into account their preferences on the objectives which can be in 
general case different, and also they would like to  make the division having a feeling of 
fairness. A solution obtained by the owners in the first case, called further as a status quo 
point, is a starting point for negotiation on the surplus division. This is an example of the 
bargaining problem you can support with the MCBARG system. In the AGRICO model 
each of two players (farm owners) has three objectives, namely: the milk production, the rye 
production, and savings of tractor power. Denoting the objectives: a l ,  a2, a3 for the first 
SET UP MODEL 
- - SET UP MODEL MENU 
COMF I LE 
EXIT 
6GHICO. MOD F I R S T .  MOD SECOND. MOD TEST1 .MOD 
Select file with Home or enter name: 
Figure 4 
player, and b l ,  b2, b3 for the second one, respectively, the agreement set is described by the 
set of the following constraints: 
a l ,  a2, a3, b l ,  b2, b3 2 0; 
14 - (a1 + b1) l J2  - a2 - b2 > 0; 
17 - (a1 + b1)'J2 - a3 - b3 2 0; 
To see how the model is introduced into the system, select the EDIT option and then select 
in a sequence the options of the EDIT MODEL menu: PLAYERS, CRITERIA, FORMULAE exiting 
each of them by pressing F9 key. You will obtain respectively the screens presented in the 
figures 5, 6 and 7. 
E D I T  MODEL AGHICO.MOD 
E D I T  MODEL MENU 
1NFOF;MfiTION 
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C R I T E R I A  r 
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+ + m o v e  c u r s o r  D e l  Bs - d e l e t e  d - enter 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
D e s c r i p t i o n  s t a t u s  QUO 
M I L t :  PRODUCTION Cth l l t e r s l  20.40 
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S A V I N G S  O F  TRACTOR POWER f t h  t r a c t o r  h o ~ t r s l  
In the figure 5 you have defined number of players (2). In the figure 6 the names of 
criteria and the status quo point are given. On the left hand side you see a notation assigned 
by the system to the particular criterion. This notation is used in description of the formulae 
defining the agreement set, as you can see on the figure 7. The left side of each equation are 
treated by the system as a comment. 
We suggest to leave the model unchanged and to exit the EDIT menu option. You can 
omit the SAVE option because the model was not changed. Select the COMPILE option of the 
E D I T  MODEL AGRICO.MOD 
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8 = 1 4  - ( a l + b 1 ) * 0 . 5  - a' - b Z :  
9 = 17 - ( a l + b 1 ) " 0 . 5  - a3 - b 3 ;  
1 c 1 =  & - a 2 1  f l l  = 8 - a 3 ;  
12 = 8 - b 2 ;  f 13 1 9 - b" '  -' I 
I 
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4 C t r l - I  - i n s e r t  l i n e  C t r l - Y  - d e l e t e  l i n e  I n s  - c h a n g e  m o d e  F 9  - e n t e r  
Figure 7 
T E S T  IMPROVEMENT D I R E C T I O N S  P l a v e r  n o  1 I t e r a t i o n  n o  1 
I N F O  CONF-COEF NEW-REF SELECT GRAPH SCROLL-CRIT  SCROLL-VAR E X I T  
Y o u r  c o n f i d e n c e  c o e f f i c i e n t  : 1 . OClOCl 
+* H o m e  E n d - m o v e  b a r  4 - - s e l e c t  O D t 1 0 n  F 1 - a c t i  v e  v a r i a n t  F 1 0 - h e l p  
Figure 8 
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SET UP MODEL menu. Wait please a moment. The system compiles the model and makes 
initial calculations. Now, you can return to the MAIN menu and start the mediation process. 
Select the TEST DIRECTION option. The system goes to the first iteration of interactive 
mediation procedure, which starts from unilateral analysis of the problem. The analysis is 
performed independently for each player. So the system displays the players numbers and 
you should select one of them. Select first the first player. On the screen presented in the 
figure 8 you can see first variant of tentative solution. 
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For each objective the following values are given: number of variant, status quo, reference 
point, solution, maximal confidence coefficient, one-shot solution, RA-utopia point and ideal 
point. The status quo and ideal points are constant within the unilateral analysis, while the 
other values depend on the confidence coefficient and reference point. Using the CONF-COEF 
option you can modify the confidence coefficient. Lower value of the coefficient means you 
have more limited confidence on the future outcomes of the game and it  results in greater 
number of iterations in the mediation procedure. Let assume the value to  be 0.3000. The 
NEWREF option allows you by specification of reference points to  generate the different variants 
of tentative solutions dependently on the currently obtained results and on your preferences. 
The status quo and ideal points define reasonable bounds for the reference points. The 
presented first solution, called as neutral solution, has been obtained for the reference point 
equal to  the ideal point. Let us assume that as the owner of the first farm (the first player), 
you prefer to  obtain first of all more milk and to  save more tractor power. So select the 
NEWREF option and type (for the second variant) ideal point values for milk and savings of 
tractor power (113.00 and 8.00, respectively), and lower value for the rye production (4.00). 
In third variant, try to  decrease the milk production (100.00) and the rye production (3.00). 
The screen will look like this: 
TEST IMPROVEMENT DIRECTIONS F ' laver  n o  1 I t e r a t i o n  no 1 
INFO CONF-COEF NEW-REF SELECT GRAPH SCROLL-CRIT SCROLL-VAR EXIT  
Yoc~r conf idence  cocf  f  i c i c n t  : O.rSOO0 
*+HomeEnd-movebar  4 - s e l e c t o p t i o n  F 1 - a c t i v e v a r i a n t  F10-help 
Figure 9 
To compare the values of solutions in the graphical form, press the GRAPH option. The 
acreen will look like in the figure 10. 
In the session, the decrease of the rye production in the third variant seems to  be too 
high for the player, so he assumes the second variant as the best. As you see, one of variant 
numbers ie highlighted. This variant is called as active. Using the F1 key you can change the 
active variant. Set please the second variant as the active one and press the SELECT option. 
In this example you do not use the SCROLL-CRIT option and SCROLL-VAR option. The first 
one allows scrolling criteria in a case when the number of criteria is greater then three. In 
such a way, any combination of three criteria from criteria set is possible to  display. The 
second one allows scrolling variants. In general case the player can introduce relatively large 
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number of variants. By properly setting the active place and scrolling it, you can compare 
any combination of three variants from all the introduced ones. 
Exit please this menu. Systems will ask you for the number of the next player making the 
interactive analysis. Select the second. The interactive analysis is performed in the same way 
as for the first player, however the values of particular quantities and the player preferences 
are in general case different. Let the second player has more limited confidence than the 
first one and assume the confidence coefficient equal to  0.200. The player tries to increase 
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first of all the rye production and savings of tractor power at  a cost of decreasing the milk 
production. Then select the fourth variant. The screen will look like in the figure 11. 
Exit this phase using the EXIT option and go back to the main menu pressing F9 key. 
Having the preferable variants for the both players selected, the cooperative solution can 
be calculated for the first iteration. Select the CALCULATE NEW AGREEMENT option and wait 
a moment for the system calculations. The system reports end of the calculations. Then 
press any key to  go back to  the MAIN menu. You can see the obtained values for particular 
objectives using the REPORT option. 
Select the TEST DIRECTION option to start interactive analysis in the second iteration. 
The interactive analysis is done in the same way as in the first iteration. Screens of the analysis 
for the first and the second players are presented in the figures 12 and 13, respectively. 
TEST IMPROVEMENT DIRECTIONS P l a y e r  no 1 I t e r a t i o n  no 2 
INFO CONF-COEF NEW-REF SELECT GRAPH SCROLL-CRIT SCROLL-VAR EXIT  
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*+ Home Elid-move bar 4 - s e l e c t  o p t i o n  F 1 - a c t i v e  v a r i a n t  F10-help 
Figure 12 
The cooperative (agreement) solution obtained at  the first iteration is assumed as the 
status quo at  the current, second one. The solution dominates strictly the status quo of the 
game and is calculated along the improvement direction defined by the preferable reference 
point selected in the first iteration. Observe decreasing of the set of agreement outcomes 
dominating the new status quo for both the players (i.e. the values of the ideal point are 
smaller than those in the previous iteration). In the second iteration both the players assume 
the confidence coefficient equal to  0.3000. The first one tries, as previously, to  increase the 
milk production and savings of tractor power in the second variant. In the third variant 
tries slightly increase the rye production, however the increase was very small for relatively 
significant decrease of savings of tractor power. So he decides to select the second variant 
as the best. The second player (Figure 13) tries to  increase the rye production. F'rom the 
introduced variants he selects the fourth one as the best. Repeat please the players actions 
and calculate the new agreement solution. 
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Start the next iteration selecting the TEST DIRECTION option from the main menu. The 
interactive analysis performed by the players is presented in the figures 14 and 15. 
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Follow their actions. Both the players assume the confidence coefficients as equal to 
1.0000. Tha t  means they decide to  have relatively high confidence on the future outcomes 
and to  not prolong the procedure for the next iteration. The first player tries consequently 
increase the milk production but not a t  the cost of too high decreasing of the rye production. 
So he decides to  select the second variant as the best. The second player increasing the 
rye production selects the third variant as the preferable one. Calculate the new agreement 
solution. After the calculation the systems reports you that  the final, efficient solution is 
found. 
Type any key and select the REPORT option. Select then the first player. You will obtain 
the first player report as in the figure 16. 
You can see values of the agreement points in the successive iterations. The values are 
presented also in the graphical form compared to  the initial s tatus quo point. The iteration 
numbers in the bars indicate the values. The values obtained a t  the last, third iteration are 
equal to  the one-shot solution. This means the final, efficient solution (on the Pareto frontier) 
in the agreement set has been reached. 
The SCROLL-CRIT option allows you to compare any combination of three criteria in a 
case of greater number of the criteria. 
Exit the report and select the second player to obtain his final result as presented in the 
figure 17. 
Exit the  report, go back to  the MAIN menu, and leave the system. 
R e f e r e n c e  
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5 Technical information 
The program is recorded on attached diskette that  should be installed on an IBM P C  family. 
This diskette contains the following files: 
MCBARG . EXE - binary code of the program, 
INFOSYS . DAT - file of records containing internal information presented in the program 
by INFO option, 
HELPSYS .DAT - file of records containing additional information presented in the pro- 
gram by HELP option, 
AGRICO .MOD - file containing the illustrative example of bargaining problem. 
The program is activated by the command: MCBARG. It automatically recognizes one of 
the following graphic cards: HERCULES, CGA, EGA. 
The program enables a user to create new models of bargaining problems and to  save 
the models on the active disk. Default extension of the files containing the models is .MOD. 
During every session with the system the following auxiliary files are generated on the disk: 
TRY. DAT, REP. DAT. They can be erased after a session. 
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